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FINALITY IN BROWNFIELDS 
REMEDIATION AND REUSE 
Joel B. Eisen* 
Thirty years after CERCLA's1 enactment, the brownfields phenomenon 
is an anomaly in the statute's complex history. The statute was not 
designed to address this problem. Instead, as a near-perfect example of the 
law of unintended consequences, 2 it arose after CERCLA was in place, and 
dealt with sites purportedly not contaminated enough to be addressed under 
it. The statutory net swept in brownfields sites (abandoned or underused 
properties, mostly in urban areas) along with highly contaminated sites, 
subjecting them to a fear of liability that hampered remediation and reuse 
prospects. Since the 1980s, however, state voluntary cleanup programs 
(VCPs), federal liability relief, and programs for brownfields developers 
have promoted redevelopment activities. 3 After the 2002 Small Business 
Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act (SBLRBRA)4 added 
liability protections,5 brownfields largely faded from the CERCLA 
headlines. 
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. Copyright 2011, all rights 
reserved. 
I. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 9601-9675 (2006). 
2. See Tom Rath, Deregulation by Any Other Name: New Jersey's Site Remediation 
Reform Act in Federal Context, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 323, 332 (2011) (calling brownfields an 
"unexpected problem"). 
3. See Joel B. Eisen, Brownfields at 20: A Critical Reevaluation, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
721, 721-23 (2007) [hereinafter Eisen, Brownfields at 20]; BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE 
GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 15 (Todd s. Davis & Scott A. Sherman 
eds., 3d ed. 2010) [hereinafter BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE]. 
4. Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 
107-118, 115Stat.2356. 
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604-9605, 9607, 9622, 9628 (2006). See Joel A. Mintz, New Loopholes or 
•Minor Adjustments?: A Summary and Evaluation of the Small Business Liability Relief and 
Brownfields Revitalization Act, 20 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 405, 405-15 (2002) [hereinafter Mintz, 
New Loopholes]. The Environmental Protection Agency's All Appropriate Inquiries Final Rule, 
promulgated in 2005 under the SBRLBRA, protects brownfield developers if they make "all 
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Brownfields' dramatic transformations from vacant or blighted sites to 
centerpieces of redevelopment activities have been core components of 
urban revitalization efforts.6 Thousands ofbrownfields abandoned for years 
are now being reborn as industrial, commercial, residential and even 
recreational sites. Take in a baseball game in Bridgeport, Connecticut7 or a 
soccer match at Red Bull Arena in Harrison, New Jersey,8 or shop or work 
at Potomac Yard in Alexandria, Virginia,9 and you are part of brownfields 
redevelopment in action. 
The brownfields "problem" looks to be over, done, finished. Today, it 
merits little more than a few pages of attention in leading books on 
CERCLA. '0 But nothing is ever final in CERCLA, and, to quote Yogi 
Berra, brownfields "ain't over 'til it's over." 11 Many issues that arose at the 
outset of heightened concern about brownfields in the 1980s are still present 
today. By all accounts, many brownfields have not been addressed at all, 
and states have not done enough to ensure that sites that have been cleaned 
up don't backslide. 12 In a parallel to ongoing concerns about CERCLA 
enforcement, the primary challenge is ensuring that there are proper 
appropriate inquiries" (including environmental investigation and remediation activities, if 
necessary) before acquiring ownership ofbrownfields sites. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 312 (2012). 
6. See U.S. EPA, INVESTING IN PARTNERSHIP, POSSIBILITY, AND PEOPLE: A REPORT TO 
STAKEHOLDERS FROM THE U.S. EPA BROWNFIELDS PROGRAM 31 (2005) [hereinafter EPA, 
INVESTING IN PARTNERSHIP, POSSIBILITY, AND PEOPLE] (discussing successful revitalization 
efforts). For a European perspective, see Bernard Vanheusden, Brownfield Redevelopment in the 
European Union, 34 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 559 (2007) and GERNOT PAHLEN, RESCUE: 
REGENERATION OF EUROPEAN SITES IN CITIES AND URBAN ENVIRONMENTS 8 (Sept. 8, 2004). 
7. See Brownjields Fact Sheet: Bridgeport's Restored Gateway Leads to a Whole New 
Impression, U.S. EPA, http://nepis.epa.gov/EP A/html/Pubs/pubalpha_ B.html (describing 
Bridgeport's brownfields redevelopment activities). 
8. The Harrison project is one example of New Jersey's Brownfield Development Area 
(BOA) Initiative, a program that attempts to address multiple brownfields in the same location. 
See U.S. EPA, STATE BROWNFIELDS AND VOLUNTARY RESPONSE PROGRAMS: AN UPDATE 
FROM THE STATES 16-17 (2011), available at http://epa.gov/brownfields/state_tribal/update201 l/ 
bf_states_report_2011.pdf [hereinafter EPA, STATE BROWNFIELDS AND VOLUNTARY RESPONSE 
PROGRAMS]; News Release, N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Protection, Dep Playing Big Role in Kick-
Starting Red Bull Soccer Stadium, Revitalization of Harrison Waterfront (Mar. 23, 2010), 
available at http://www.nj.gov/dep/newsrel/201Oil0_0019.htm. 
9. See One and Two Potomac Yard, NAT'L INST. OF BUILDING SCI. (2012), 
http://www.wbdg.org/references/cs_potomac.php (stating that remediation was overseen by the 
EPA with a "no further action" letter issued by the EPA and the Virginia Department of 
Environmental Quality). 
10. For example, in JOHN s. APPLEGATE & JANG. LAITOS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: RCRA, 
CERCLA, AND THE MANAGEMENT OF HAZARDOUS w ASTE 266-69 (2006), the authors addressed 
the problem in only four pages. 
11. YOGI BERRA, THE YOGI BOOK 157 (1998). 
12. See Rath, supra note 2, at 327. 
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oversight resources. 13 It should surprise no one that states often are 
reluctant to pay much attention to a problem they think they have "solved," 
even if it is demonstrated that is not completely true. 14 
Environmental justice advocates and others have demonstrated the 
need to involve the public in planning for the future at brownfields sites, 15 
and while public input is increasingly part of brownfields remediation and 
reuse, it is not always meaningful. 16 Another trend of the past two decades 
is the emergence of a broader land use planning agenda centered on 
sustainability, and its intersection with brownfields laws and policies. 17 As 
one report observes, "Communities will succeed in brownfields 
revitalization when they consider these properties as community and 
economic opportunities that happen to have an environmental challenge, 
and connect brownfields initiatives to their broader community vision and 
revitalization priorities."18 This responds in part to the challenge of climate 
change, which was less well known at the time most VCPs began. To 
many, brownfields now "take center stage in a sustainable planning strategy 
of thwarting sprawl, preserving open space, reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions, and reinvesting in urban areas and their communities." 19 
The intersection of brownfields redevelopment and these broader 
concerns presents a host of issues. Does redevelopment of brownfields 
connect to a larger vision for the city that links with "smart growth" and 
climate action goals? Retooling the original developer-centered vision of 
VCPs to promote broader goals is an ongoing challenge. Has the affected 
community been involved in planning for brownfields remediation, or has 
the developer controlled the process? The latter narrows the ability to view 
13. See Joel A. Mintz, EPA Enforcement of CERCLA: Historical Overview and Recent 
Trends, 41 Sw. L. REV. 645, 657-58 (2012). 
14. See Eisen, Brownfields at 20, supra note 3, at 722. 
15. See generally Clifford Rechtschaffen et al., Environmental Justice: Law, Policy and 
Environmental Protection, SEATTLE U. SCH. OF LAW LEGAL PAPER SERIES# l 0-24 (2009). 
16. See Joel B. Eisen, 'Brownfields of Dreams'?: Challenges and Limits of Voluntary 
Cleanup Programs and Incentives, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 883, 998 (1996) [hereinafter Eisen, 
Brownfields of Dreams]. 
17. See John Dernbach, Creating the Law of Environmentally Sustainable Economic 
Development, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 614, 615 (2011) (discussing "renewable energy 
technology, green infrastructure, recycling, brownfield redevelopment, and other forms of more 
sustainable economic development"); Joel B. Eisen, Brownfields Policies for Sustainable Cities, 9 
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 187, 189-90 (1999) [hereinafter Eisen, Brownfields Policies for 
Sustainable Cities]. 
18. NAT'L Ass'N OF LOCAL Gov'T PROF'LS. & NE.-MIDWEST INST., UNLOCKING 
BROWNFIELDS: KEYS TO COMMUNITY REVITALIZATION 6 (2004). 
19. JUSTIN B. HOLLANDER ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF BROWNFIELD REGENERATION: CLEANUP, 
DESIGN, AND REUSE OF DERELICT LAND 2-3 (2010) [hereinafter HOLLANDER ET AL., PRINCIPLES 
OF BROWNFIELDS REGENERATION]. 
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the project as part of a community-wide plan, and undermines its 
legitimacy. Finally, if brownfields redevelopment yields benefits, how can 
we measure success over the long term? Metrics for assessing this are only 
just now emerging. 
As I note in Part III, many key questions have incomplete answers 
today, and as a result, finality in brownfields remediation and reuse 
continues to elude us. I draw a number of examples from New Jersey, a 
Rust Belt state with many brownfields and a complex history of dealing 
with them. 20 Recent developments in that state, including a 2009 state 
statute that privatized cleanups,21 and well-publicized funding shortfalls and 
regulatory errors in 2011, 22 highlight the challenges of contemporary 
brownfields redevelopment. 
I. THE BROWNFIELDS "PROBLEM" 
"Brownfields" are abandoned or underused sites that the SBLRBRA 
defines as "real property, the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which 
may be complicated by the presence or potential presence of a hazardous 
substance, pollutant, or contaminant."23 The United States has perhaps 
400,000 to as many as one million brownfields,24 although reliable 
information is hard to come by.25 
These sites are found throughout the nation, but urban brownfields 
such as abandoned steel mills or other manufacturing facilities, and 
formerly grand railroad stations now idle,26 attract the most attention.27 
20. For discussions of New Jersey's site remediation programs, see generally Alexander 
Maro, Outsourcing the Filth: Privatizing Brownfield Remediation in New Jersey, 38 B.C. ENVTL. 
AFF. L. REV. 159 (2011); Eisen, Brownfields at 20, supra note 3; Rath, supra note 2, at 336-42. 
21. Site Remediation Reform Act of 2009, ch. 60, 2009 N.J. Laws 476 (codified at N.J. 
STAT. ANN.§ 58:10C-l-29 (West Supp. 2012)). 
22. See Christopher Baxter, N.J. to shut down state initiative intended to help clean up 
'brownfields,' NJ.COM (June 2, 2011, 7:57 PM), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/06/ 
nj_to_shut_down_state_initiati_l.html [hereinafter Baxter, N.J. to shut down state initiative]. 
23. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(39)(A) (2006). 
24. U.S. GOV'T ACCT. OFFICE, BROWNFIELD REDEVELOPMENT: STAKEHOLDERS REPORT 
THAT EPA'S PROGRAM HELPS TO REDEVELOP SITES, BUT ADDITIONAL MEASURES COULD 
COMPLEMENT AGENCY EFFORTS I (2004). See also NAT'L Ass'N OF LOCAL Gov'T PROF'LS. & 
NE.-MIDWEST INST., supra note 18, at 3; Brownfield Projects, NEW JERSEY ENVIRONMENTAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE TRUST (2010), http://www.njeit.org/brownfield.htm. 
25. See KRIS WERNSTEDT ET AL., RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, VOLUNTARY 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS AT CONTAMINATED PROPERTIES 17 (2010), available at 
http://www.rff.org/rff/documents/rff-dp-10-18. pdf [hereinafter WERNSTEDT ET AL., VOLUNTARY 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS]. New Jersey alone may have more than 10,000 brownfields sites. 
Brownfield Projects, NEW JERSEY ENVIRONMENTAL INFRASTRUCTURE TRUST, supra note 24. 
26. See KRIS WERNSTEDT ET AL., RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, THE BROWNFIELDS 
PHENOMENON: MUCH ADO ABOUT SOMETHING OR THE TIMING OF THE SHREWD? 7 (2004), 
2012] FINALITY JN BROWNFIELDS 777 
Some make up a brownfields variant of "orphan sites"28 : former owners are 
gone, and cities or other public entities now own them. 29 They have often 
had numerous owners and histories of industrial or commercial use, but 
have not been touched for years. 30 Without environmental investigations, it 
is often difficult to discern the extent of contamination or need for 
remediation, let alone whether sites would be dangerous enough to qualify 
for the National Priorities List ("NPL").31 
Brownfields sites may have advantages over other locations. They 
often sit near railroads, highways, other forms of transportation, and the 
bulk of cities' populations.32 Yet developers often have the choice of 
foregoing them altogether for greenfield sites in suburbs and exurbs. 33 The 
cost of redeveloping a brownfield can be higher than that of a greenfield 
site.34 This is not universally the case, however. If the greenfield site has 
been previously developed and requires rehabilitation of its own, that might 
negate the cost advantage,35 and if the infrastructure at the brownfield site is 
usable, that might help narrow the cost disadvantage.36 
Brownfields redevelopment has numerous potential benefits. 37 As the 
EPA puts it, "Revitalizing brownfield sites creates benefits at the site and 
available at http://www.rff.org/rf£1documents/RFF-DP-04-46.pdf [hereinafter WERNSTEDT ET AL., 
THE BROWNFIELDS PHENOMENON]. 
27. See Eisen, Brownfields at 20, supra note 3, at 725-26. 
28. See WERNSTEDT ET AL., VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS, supra note 25, at 
14-15 (noting that over 50% of surveyed brownfields were vacant at the time of entry into a VCP). 
29. See JUSTIN B. HOLLANDER, POLLUTED & DANGEROUS: AMERICA'S WORST 
ABANDONED PROPERTIES AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT THEM 2-4 (2009). 
30. See Eisen, Brownfields at 20, supra note 3, at 725. 
31. See Eisen, Brownfie/ds of Dreams, supra note 16, at 929-30. 
32. See Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, One Piece of the Puzzle: Why State Brownfields 
Programs Can't Lure Businesses to the Urban Cores Without Finding the Missing Pieces, 51 
RUTGERS L. REV. 1075, 1093-94 (1999); CHARLES BARTSCH, COMING CLEAN FOR ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT: A RESOURCE BOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT OPPORTUNITIES ch. I, pt. l (1996), available at http://www.nemw.org/ 
images/stories/docurnents/cmclean.pdf; Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 16, at 890-92. 
33. See BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 3, at 10; Eisen, Brownfields 
of Dreams, supra note 16, at 891-92. 
34. Robert H. Abrams, Superfund and the Evolution of Brownfie/ds, 21 WM. & MARY 
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 265, 277-281 (1997) (discussing the cost disadvantages ofbrownfields). 
35. James Boyd et al., The Effects of Environmental Liability on Industrial Real Estate 
Development, 12 J. REALEST. FIN. & ECON. 37, 37-38 (1996). 
36. Evans Paull, The Environmental and Economic Impacts of Brownfields Redevelopment, 
32 (NE-Midwest Inst., Working Draft for Distribution, July 2008), available at 
http://www.nemw.org/images/stories/documents/EnvironEconlmpactsBFRedev. pdf. 
37. See, e.g., JUDITH AUER SHAW ET AL., MEASURING BROWNFIELD SUCCESS IN NEW 
JERSEY: How DATA INCREASES OUR COMPETITIVE EDGE 20-22 (2008), available at 
http://www.policy.rutgers.edu/brownfields/projects/success.pdf. 
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throughout the community."38 Building on urban sites, with their existing 
footprints and infrastructure, can alleviate sprawl by decreasing the need to 
consume greenfield lands.39 According to a 2001 study, redeveloping one 
acre of brownfields can conserve as much as an average of 6.2 acres of 
greenfields.40 Brownfield redevelopment can be an effective component of 
a climate change policy if it spurs a decrease in commuting and therefore in 
vehicle miles traveled,41 as transportation accounts for the nation's second 
largest share of GHG emissions.42 Other potential benefits include 
reductions in storm water runoff and air pollution,43 and increased property 
values in neighboring areas.44 At five revitalized sites, the EPA found a 32 
to 57 percent reduction in vehicle miles traveled, a 47 to 62 percent 
reduction in storm water runoff, and a 2-3 percent increase in adjacent 
property values.45 
In the mid- to late-1980s, some began to argue that a major challenge 
to brownfields redevelopment (and perhaps the most prominent one) was 
the stigma from the possible presence of environmental contamination. 46 A 
1992 Congressional field hearing in Ohio saw the first use of the term 
"brownfield,"47 in contrast to pristine "greenfield" sites. Many claimed 
reform to CERCLA and other laws was indispensable to removing the 
"brown" stigma. 48 This fear of liability was overstated, as it turned out that 
the vast majority of brownfields sites were not contaminated enough to 
38. The EPA Brownjields Program Reduces Widespread Environmental and Economic 
Benefits, U.S. EPA (Sept. 2012), http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/ove1view/Brownfields-Benefits-
postcard.pdf [hereinafter EPA, Brownfields Benefits]. 
39. See JONATHAN P. DEASON ET AL., PUBLIC POLICIES AND PRIVATE DECISIONS 
AFFECTING THE REDEVELOPMENT OF BROWNFIELDS: AN ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL FACTORS, 
RELATIVE WEIGHTS AND AREAL DIFFERENTIALS § 8.1 (2001), available at 
http://www.gwu.edu/-eem/Brownfields/project_report/report.htm; Eisen, Brownfields at 20, supra 
note 3, at 750; Paull, supra note 36, at 5. 
40. DEASON ET AL., supra note 39, at§ 5.3. 
41. See Paull, supra note 36, at 5. 
42. DAVID L. GREENE & ANDREAS SCHAFER, REDUCING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 
FROM U.S. TRANSPORTATION 2 (2003), available at http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/reducing-
transportation-ghg.pdf. 
43. Paull, supra note 36, at 17-20; NAT'L Ass'N OF LOCAL GOV'T PROF'LS. & NE.-
MIDWEST INST., supra note 18, at 101, 104. 
44. Paull, supra note 36, at 29-30. 
45. EPA, Brownfields Benefits, supra note 38. 
46. See BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 3, at 7-8. 
47. Office of Health, Safety & Sec., U.S. Dep't of Energy, The Brownjields Solution, 
OPERATING EXPERIENCE SUMMARY 3, I (Feb. 28, 2009), http://www.hss.energy.gov/sesa/ 
analysis/oesummary/oesummary2009/2009-02-03.pdf; Jonathan D. Weiss, Local Governance, in 
STUMBLING TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY 683, 683 (John c. Dembach ed., 2009) ("The word 
'brownfields' was not even in the dictionary in 1992; it achieved that honor in 1999."). 
48. See BARTSCH, supra note 32, at ch. 1, pt. I. 
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wind up on the NPL.49 It also gave CERCLA greater prominence than it 
deserved among other barriers to urban redevelopment, such as changes in 
consumer preferences or residential patterns.50 
Still, there was something to the fear of liability. Throughout the 
1980s, courts gave the EPA more power under CERCLA to investigate and 
remediate sites, and to the EPA and private parties to fasten liability on 
PRPs.51 CERCLA's broad liability provisions capture a wide group of 
entities, whether or not they did any actual waste dumping. Attempting to 
evaluate brownfield sites might subject developers to liability because 
owners and "operators" are jointly and severally liable under CERCLA, 
whether or not they owned the sites at the time of disposal. 52 Therefore, 
assuming serious contamination was discovered, a developer might face the 
full price tag of CERCLA remediation even if it did nothing to cause the 
contamination there. 53 
Developers balked at becoming involved with brownfields, fearing the 
worst.54 Remediation costs could not be quantified ahead of time,55 and 
even after investigations, knowing cleanups' price tags would be difficult. 
CERCLA cleanups cannot be priced in advance, because remediation is a 
lengthy process that includes (among other requirements) compliance with 
ARARs-requirements of other environmental laws.56 And if merely 
investigating the conditions at a brownfield site, let alone making decisions 
49. See BROWNFJELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 3, at 4-5; Eisen, Brownfields 
of Dreams, supra note 16, at 90 l. 
50. See SHAW ET AL., supra note 37, at 2-4 (discussing the issue generally and listing the 
seven principal categories of barriers to brownfields redevelopment found by researchers at 
George Washington University in 2001). 
51. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (2006). 
52. CERCLA imposes liability on "the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility," which 
applies to current owners without regard for whether they owned sites at the time of disposal of 
hazardous substances. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l) (2006). See also Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, 
supra note 16, at 90 l. 
53. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 168 (4th Cir. 1994) ("The plain 
language of section l 07(a)(2) extends liability to owners of waste facilities regardless of their 
degree of participation in the subsequent disposal of hazardous waste."). See also ELIZABETH 
GLASS GELTMAN, RECYCLING LAND: UNDERSTANDING THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF 
BROWNFIELD DEVELOPMENT 53-54 (2000); Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 16, at 90 l; 
Robertson, supra note 32, at 1084. 
54. See Boyd et al., supra note 35, at 37. 
55. See BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 3, at 8-9; Eisen, Brownfields 
of Dreams, supra note 16, at 906-07. 
56. BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 3, at 124. See Eisen, Brownfields 
of Dreams, supra note 16, at 907-09; Robertson, supra note 32, at 1089; NAT'L ASS'N OF LOCAL 
Gov'T PROF'LS. & NE.-MIDWEST INST., supra note 18, at 124. 
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about how to remediate them, might' expose a developer to liability, it was 
easier to shun the site. 
Amendments to CERCLA and EPA policies aimed to lessen 
developers' burden, but were largely unsuccessful. The 1986 SARA 
amendments57 added an "innocent landowner" defense designed to protect 
those, like brownfields developers, who purchased sites after waste 
dumping took place, and were therefore not responsible for contaminating 
them.58 However, this defense was not widely used, because meeting its 
requirements was difficult. 59 Those seeking to prove their innocence had to 
demonstrate that they had engaged in "all appropriate inquiry" before 
purchasing a site.60 Most courts retained liability for prospective purchasers 
who had not discovered the contamination before purchasing the sites, 
reasoning they probably had not done enough investigation.61 
Thus, rather than protect brownfields developers, the innocent 
landowner defense's shortcomings led many to claim more CERCLA 
reform was needed.62 Brownfields advocates sought partnerships with 
environmental agencies rather than adversarial enforcement-based 
relationships, shorter cleanup processes with more certainty (including 
releases or other forms of indicating that the brownfields purchaser would 
not face liability), and lesser cleanup standards that in some cases would 
allow less costly means of addressing contamination at the site (for 
example, so-called "institutional controls" such as fences and warning 
signs).63 
States hit hardest by the recession of the early 1990s tended to be the 
ones with the most brownfields.64 Difficult economic conditions added to 
the increasingly widespread concern that CERCLA (and its state analogues 
57. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 
1613 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (2006)). 
58. See SUSAN OPP & SARAH HOLLIS, CONTAMINATED PROPERTIES: HISTORY, 
REGULATIONS, AND RESOURCES FOR COMMUNITY MEMBERS 6 (U. Louisville Ctr. for Envtl. 
Pol'y & Mgmt., 2005). 
59. See L. Jager Smith, Jr., CERCLA 's Innocent Landowner Defense: Oasis or Mirage?, 18 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 155, 156-57 (1993). 
60. See id. at 159. 
61. See Larry Schnapf, The New "All Appropriate Inquiries" Rule, THE PRACTICAL REAL 
ESTATE LAWYER, Jan. 2007, at 10. 
62. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 59. 
63. See Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 16, at 948. See also John Pendergrass, 
Institutional Controls in the States: What Is and Can Be Done to Protect Public Health at 
Brownfie/ds, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1303, 1304 (2003). 
64. See U.S. CONF. OF MAYORS, RECYCLING AMERICA'S LAND; A NATIONAL REPORT ON 
BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT 10 (1993-2010) (Nov. 2010), available at http://www. 
usmayors.org/pressreleases/uploads/november201 Obfreport.pdf. 
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created in the 1980s) were holding back productive investments.65 This 
prompted calls to remove barriers to redeveloping cities, 66 in which 
CERCLA was no longer seen as a force for good, but as one of those 
barriers. Any remediation and reuse activities at urban brownfields were 
thought to be preferable to continued neglect, even if they did not comport 
with CERCLA's rigid remediation requirements. 67 
II. BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT IN THE STATES, AND FEDERAL 
LIABILITY PROTECTION 
While brownfields developers were said to fear CERCLA liability, far 
more sites were subject to the cleanup requirements of state CERCLA-like 
analogues.68 Several states in the Northeast, including New Jersey, also had 
separate property transfer laws requiring evaluation (and remediation if 
necessary) of potentially contaminated sites prior to their transfer. 69 Given 
this legal environment, the states became primary drivers for brownfields 
redevelopment. 70 Between the late 1980s and mid-1990s, many states 
overhauled their environmental cleanup and property transfer laws, creating 
VCPs to promote brownfields redevelopment. 71 
According to one recent estimate, state VCPs have addressed more 
than 50,000 brownfields sites, and evaluate another 7,000 - 8,000 sites each 
year.72 "Voluntary" indicates that the process begins when developers 
approach the states to commence remediation and reuse activities. 73 The 
regulatory climate aims to create a working relationship between state 
regulators and developers, and is sharply different from CERCLA's 
65. See CHARLES BARTSCH & ELIZABETH COLLATON, BROWNFIELDS: CLEANING AND 
REUSING CONTAMINATED PROPERTIES 2, 19 (1997). 
66. See BARTSCH, supra note 32, at ch. 1, pt. I. 
67. See NAT'L ASS'N OF LOCAL GOV'T PROF'LS. & NE.-MIDWEST INST., supra note 18, at 
11. 
68. See WERNSTEDT ET AL., THE BROWNFIELDS PHENOMENON, supra note 26, at 2; 
BARTSCH & COLLA TON, supra note 65, at 5, 18. 
69. See Eisen, Brownjields of Dreams, supra note 16, at 915; BROWNFIELDS: A 
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 3, at 795-96; BARTSCH & COLLATON,supra note 65, at 17. 
70. See BARTSCH & COLLATON,supra note 65, at 5, 19. 
71. See Eisen, Brownjie/ds at 20, supra note 3, at 721; Maro, supra note 20, at 171-73 
(describing New Jersey's program). 
72. Paull, supra note 36, at 5. 
73. BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 3, at 11. See also Eisen, 
Brownfie/ds of Dreams, supra note 16, at 920-21. 
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enforcement-driven model.74 
attributes: 75 
VCPs typically include three central 
Streamlined administrative processes: In VCPs, the steps between 
identification of a site as one to which the program will apply, and final 
remediation and reuse, are far less in number and shorter in duration than in 
enforcement-driven models.76 Often, developers are put in control of many 
steps of the process (in some states, by hiring licensed environmental 
professionals to administer the entire cleanup).77 
Risk-based cleanup standards: In VCPs, the end use to which sites will 
be put (such as commercial, industrial, or residential) is factored into the 
risk assessment of the sites, leading to standards that typically require less 
than complete remediation. 78 Often, developers can cut costs by adopting 
remedies such as entombing soils at brownfield sites rather than removing 
and treating them. 79 
Liability protection: States offer a number of means for developers to 
secure protection against future enforcement actions by their environmental 
agencies, ranging from "no further action" letters (statements of intent that 
developers would not face liability in the future) to full releases from 
liability. 80 
In states such as New Jersey, licensed environmental professionals 
often decide cleanup levels within defined parameters.81 New Jersey's 2009 
Site Remediation Reform Act ended the previous Voluntary Cleanup 
Program and devolved cleanup decisions to licensed professionals. 82 
Licensed professionals may issue "Remedial Action Outcome" documents 
certifying completion of remediation activities without prior approval from 
74. See David A. Dana, State Brownfields Programs as Laboratories of Democracy?, 14 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 86 (2005). 
75. Eisen, Brown.fields of Dreams, supra note 16, at 886-87; Robertson, supra note 32, at 
1101-07. BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE: THE CLEANUP & REDEVELOPMENT OF 
CONT AMINA TED LAND (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2006) contains a list of individual state programs. 
76. See Eisen, Brown.fields of Dreams, supra note 16, at 920 n.180, 970. 
77. Id. at 965-70; Maro, supra note 20, at 181. 
78. Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 16, at 936-38. 
79. Id. at 948. 
80. Id. at 950-58. 
81. See Brownfield Site Contamination, N.J. INST. OF TECH., http://www.njit.edu/ 
tab/managing/pre-development/contamination-investigation.php (last visited Oct. 22, 2012). 
82. See Maro, supra note 20, at 180-82 (describing the Licensed Site Remediation 
Professionals scheme); JAMES PETERSON, THE ROLE OF THE LICENSED SITE REMEDIATION 
PROFESSIONALS (2011), available at http://www.slideshare.net/JamesPetersonLSRP/the-role-of-
the-lsrp-in-brownfields-remediation. 
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the Department of Environmental Protection. 83 This process takes these 
critical decisions out of the hands of state environmental authorities, and 
relies on quality control of the professionals to ensure proper results. 84 This 
"outsourcing" may provide brownfields developers with the state liability 
protection they seek, but provides no government's guarantee that they have 
undertaken proper remediation activities.85 
Federal liability, of course, is another matter altogether. Before 2002, 
developers could obtain protection against state liability by completing 
remediation activities in VCPs, but there was no exemption from CERCLA 
liability. 86 Even though states could not protect developers against federal 
liability, their releases were typically viewed as sufficient comfort to 
proceed with redevelopment activities. 87 There was some federal activity 
on the liability front. States negotiated with the EPA to create memoranda 
of understanding that gave some protection to sites addressed in their VCPs 
without a full release from liability.88 The CERCLA innocent landowner 
defense and some federal programs, such as the EPA's guidance on 
"prospective purchaser agreements," provided limited protections.89 
After the SBLRBRA's enactment in 2002, the prospect of CERCLA 
liability receded. The SBLRBRA provided a prospective purchaser 
exemption from CERCLA, which the EPA subsequently issued regulations 
to clarify.90 The EPA regulations require the prospective purchaser to allow 
access to and cooperate with regulators,91 and exercise care in dealing with 
the prior releases of contaminants at the site so as not to exacerbate the 
problem.92 The new law also restricted actions under CERCLA against 
developers who remediate sites in VCPs. 93 
83. Site Remediation Program, N.J. DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, http://www.state.nj.us/ 
dep/srp/ (last updated Oct. 9, 2012). See also Maro, supra note 20, at 181-82; EPA, STATE 
BROWNFIELDS AND VOLUNTARY RESPONSE PROGRAMS, supra note 8, at 16-17. 
84. See Peterson, supra note 82, at 13-39 (describing the "commandments" for LSRPs). 
85. See Maro, supra note 20, at 180-82; Rath, supra note 2, at 337. 
86. See NAT'L ASS'N OF LOCAL Gov'T PROF'LS. & NE.-MIDWEST INST., supra note 18, at 
83. 
87. See id.; Eisen, Brownjields of Dreams, supra note 16, at 950-58. 
88. See BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSNE GUIDE, supra note 3, at 52; Eisen, Brownfields 
of Dreams, supra note 16, at 964 n.348. 
89. See BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSNE GUIDE, supra note 3, at 52; Eisen, Brownfields 
of Dreams, supra note 16, at 982-83. 
90. See BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 3, at 83. 
91. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 312 (2012). 
92. See id.; Mintz, New Loopholes, supra note 5, at 406, 412; Schnapf, supra note 61, at 10-
11. 
93. See Mintz, New Loopholes, supra note 5, at 420. 
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Ill. A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO "FINALITY" 
The SBLRBRA provided liability protection, but did not bring finality 
to the brownfields problem. One challenge is simply that many sites have 
not been addressed. While large urban brownfields have been reused, other 
sites sit neglected. According to one recent estimate, states have only 
successfully dealt with 1 % to 2% of all brownfields sites.94 
A VCP traditionally deals with each site on its own, and remediation 
and reuse plans often have no requirement to relate to any comprehensive 
plan for urban redevelopment.95 There are exceptions to this, as some 
American cities eschew parcel-by-parcel redevelopment in favor of more 
systematic redevelopment approaches.96 However, finality demands a 
broader approach than is currently employed at many sites. 
A. Relationship to Smart Growth and Climate Action 
A brownfields project should fit within an overall plan of development 
for the affected community, with the community viewing the economic, 
environmental and institutional elements in a framework that considers all 
impacts and not just those of remediation. 97 One problem, as noted above, 
is the parcel-specific nature of brownfields redevelopment. 98 New York 
and New Jersey have area-wide brownfields initiatives, in which regulators 
attempt to address multiple brownfields in the same community. 99 It has 
been noted that, "[i]n contrast to site-specific remediation, the area-wide 
approach of the [New Jersey] BDA provides a framework that addresses the 
94. EVANS PAULL, ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF BROWNFIELDS slide 11 
(2009), available at http://www.nalgep.org/ewebeditpro/items/093F 18694.pdf. 
95. Eisen, Brownfields Policies for Sustainable Cities, supra note 17, at 225, 227. 
96. See, e.g., U.S. CONF. OF MAYORS, supra note 64, at 9. 
97. See WILLIAM SARNI, GREENING BROWNFIELDS: REMEDIATION THROUGH 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 84-85 (2009); CHRISTOPHER DE SOUSA, BROWNFIELDS 
REDEVELOPMENT AND THE QUEST FOR SUSTAINABILITY 265-272 (2008) (Current Research in 
Urban and Reg'! Studies, vol. 3). 
98. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text. 
99. D. Evan van Hook, et al., The Challenge of Brownfield Clusters: Implementing a Multi-
Site Approach for Brownfield Remediation and Reuse, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 111, 113 (2003); 
Brownfield Opportunity Areas Program, N.Y. DEPT. OF ENVTL. CONSERV., http://www.dec. 
ny.gov/chernical/8447.htrnl; Brownfields Development Area (BDA) Initiative, N.J. DEP'T OF 
ENVTL. PROT., http://www.state.nj.us/dep/srp/brownfields/bda/. See Nicholas Capuano, Silent 
Blight: New York's Brownfields & Environmental Justice, 20 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 811, 812 
(2003). See also Maro, supra note 20, at 174-79 (discussing the BDA Initiative). 
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larger physical, political and social contexts of an affected community."100 
The EPA has called for more "area-wide planning among areas and 
corridors of brownfield sites,"101 selecting twenty-three communities for 
grants to develop area-wide plans. 102 
In one encouraging development, there are active links between the 
"smart growth" movement and brownfields redevelopment. 103 "Smart 
growth" refers to the myriad of "creative strategies to develop in ways that 
preserve natural lands and critical environmental areas, protect water and 
air quality, and reuse already-developed land," which stand in opposition to 
the existing patterns of "sprawl" -centered development. 104 However, the 
fact that brownfields projects use existing urban land and, at times, some 
existing infrastructure, does not necessarily make that growth "smart."105 
There are many opportunities for smart reuse of brownfield sites that 
would not only conserve greenfields acreage but also deploy green 
technologies to reduce carbon emissions and produce other benefits. 106 
Some sites have been transformed into urban greenways. 107 An intriguing 
new use of brownfields sites is for renewable energy facilities, 108 including 
so-called "brightfields"109 locating solar panel arrays and wind turbines at 
100. Kris Wernstedt & Jennifer Hanson, Areawide Brownfield Regeneration Through 
Business-Based Land Trusts and Progressive Finance, LINCOLN INST. OF LAND POL'Y, 7 (2006), 
available at http://www.Jincolninst.edu/pubs/dl/1096_ Wernstedt_complete_ web.pdf. 
101. EPA, Brownfields Benefits, supra note 38. 
102. Brownfields Area-Wide Planning Pilot Program, U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/ 
brownfields/areawide _grants.htm. 
103. See Patricia E. Salk.in, Smart Growth and Sustainable Development: Threads of a 
National Land Use Policy, 36 VAL. L. REV. 381, 391-92, 396-97 (2002); Smart Growth and 
Brownfields, U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/piedpage/brownfields.htm. 
104. See About Smart Growth, U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/smartgrowth/about_sg. 
htm; Sustainability Depends on Curbing Urban Sprawl, Resource Drain and Overall Waste, 
SMART GROWTH ONLINE, http://www.smartgrowth.org/engine/events.php/2010/news-26. 
105. Eisen, Brownfields at 20, supra note 3, at 749-50. 
106. See SARNI, supra note 97, at 86; PETER CALTHORPE, URBANISM IN THE AGE OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE 106 (2010); Greg Lewis, Brown to Green: Sustainable Redevelopment of 
America's Brownfield Sites, NE.-MIDWEST INST.: CENT. FOR POL'Y INITIATIVES, 
http://www.nemw.org/images/issues/brownfields/2008-12-26%20-
%20Green%20brownfield%20issue%20brief.pdf. 
107. HOLLANDER ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF BROWNFIELDS REGENERATION, supra note 19, at 86 
(discussing the Assunpink Greenway in Trenton, NJ). 
108. See Uma Outka, The Renewable Energy Footprint, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 241, 281-82, 
299-301 (2011); Steven Ferrey, Converting Brownfield Environmental Negatives into Energy 
Positives, 34 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 417 (2007); Hannah Wiseman, Expanding Renewable 
Regional Governance, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 477, 510 (2011). 
109. HOLLANDER ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF BROWNFIELDS REGENERATION, supra note 19, at 
54-55. 
786 SOUTHWESTERN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
urban sites. 110 Using green design and construction techniques in 
overhauling existing buildings at a brownfields site may conserve energy 
and feature sustainable building materials and creative waste reduction 
strategies. 111 The LEED certification system for sustainable buildings 
awards points for building on a brownfields site, and adds points for 
variables like building close to existing transportation systems. 112 
An evolving long-term trend involves planning activities that explicitly 
connect brownfields with actions to address climate change. 113 Local 
sustainability or environmental quality departments are integrating 
brownfields redevelopment with community-wide land use planning 
efforts. 114 Climate action plans (such as those developed in Portland and 
Cincinnati, which discuss the role of brownfields redevelopment 115) can be 
excellent tools for integrating brownfields redevelopment planning in a 
city's climate change response. 
Although there has been much progress in this area at brownfields 
sites, "there is still room and need for further experimentation and 
implementation of sustainable and green methodologies." 116 That could 
serve as a summary of the relationship between greentech and brownfields 
redevelopment at present: much has been accomplished, but there are still 
considerable opportunities. Some form of evaluative approach will also be 
necessary to determine whether brownfields policies meet the criteria 
outlined in climate action plans. 117 
110. Abby Gruen, N.J. Senate passes role for solar and wind development on brownfie/ds, 
NJ.COM (Aug. 23, 2010, 5:05 PM), http://www.nj.com/business/index.ss£'2010/08/ 
nj_senate_passes_rule_for_sola.html; Brockton Brightfie/ds, CITY OF BROCKTON, http://www. 
brockton.ma.us/govemment/departments/Planning/BrocktonBrighfields.aspx (describing the 
Brockton Gas Works project). 
111. See, e.g., LEED Green Building Rating Systems, U.S. GREEN BUILDING COUNCIL, 
https://new.usgbc.org/leed/rating-systems; Green Building, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGCY., http:// 
www.epa.gov/greenbuilding/. 
112. LEED Green Building Rating Systems, supra note 111. 
113. See Paull, supra note 94, at slide 17. 
114. One of many examples is Asheville, North Carolina's Office of Sustainability. See 
Sustainability, CITY OF ASHEVILLE, N.C: OFFICE OF SUSTAINABILITY, http://www.ashevillenc. 
gov/Departments/Sustainability.aspx. 
115. See City of Portland and Multnomah County Climate Action Plan 2009, CITY OF 
PORTLAND BUREAU OF PLANNING AND SUSTAINABILITY, (Oct. 2009), http://www. 
portlandoregon.gov/bps/article/268612; Climate Protection Action Plan: The Green Cincinnati 
Plan, CITY OF CINCINNATI, 201-02 (Jun. 19, 2008), http://www.cincinnati-oh.gov/ 
oeq/assets/File/climate _protection_ action _plan. pdf. 
116. Lewis, supra note 106, at 15. 
117. Ronell Auld et al., Assessing Brownfield Sustainability: Life Cycle Analysis and Carbon 
Footprinting, W. PA. BROWNFIELDS CTR., (2011), http://www.cmu.edu/steinbrenner/brownfields/ 
Current°/o20Projects/sustainability.html. 
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B. Community Participation 
Brownfields remediation and reuse often "dramatically impact[s] the 
health and economy of the nearby communities,"118 and community 
planners have therefore viewed participation of the affected community as 
critical to a brownfields project's success.119 As one report observes, 
"Community involvement and consensus is one of the most important 
ingredients for a successful brownfield project."120 Different actors may 
have diverging ideas about the ideal plan for transforming an urban 
brownfield site, 121 and public involvement in the process can bring a wider 
focus on community redevelopment than that of a developer. 122 Discussing 
a number of successful projects since the 1990s, the EPA has observed that, 
"By creating a dialogue among all stakeholders in a brownfields project, 
community engagement enhances the final reuse of the property and the 
long-term success of the project."123 Public participation in brownfields 
redevelopment also recognizes the central concern of environmental justice 
advocates124 that sites are often in areas of cities where residents have 
"traditionally been left out of the planning process,"125 and community 
outreach can address the political marginalization of these residents. 
Yet to many developers, economic concerns are paramount. 126 For this 
reason, the initial design of many VCPs empowered developers to fix the 
extent of public input in decision-making at brownfields sites. 127 This is a 
sharp distinction between this process and the CERCLA model, where 
extensive public participation in cleanup activities is mandatory. 128 
118. Building Capacity: Brownfields Redevelopment for Community·Based Organizations, 
NAT'L. CTR. FOR NEIGHBORHOOD & BROWNFIELDS REDEVT, l-1 (Apr. 2008). 
119. Daniel M. Speiss, Public Participation in Brownfields Cleanup and Redevelopment: The 
Role of Community Organizations, 1-2 (2008) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan), 
http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/60850/1/dspiess_l.pdf. See EPA, STATE 
BROWNFIELDS AND VOLUNTARY RESPONSE PROGRAMS, supra note 8, at 12, 17; U.S. CONF. OF 
MAYORS, supra note 64, at 9, 10. 
120. NAT'L ASS'N OF LOCAL GOV'T PROF' LS. & NE.-MIDWEST INST., supra note 18, at 6. 
121. See Eisen, Brownfields Policies for Sustainable Cities, supra note 17, at 202. 
122. See SARNI, supra note 97, at 84-85. 
123. Building Vibrant Communities: Community Benefits of Land Revitalization, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROT. AGCY., 2 (Oct. 2009), http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/policy/comben.pdf. 
124. Eisen, Brownfields Policies for Sustainable Cities, supra note 17, at 219-229 (discussing 
the link between brownfields and environmental justice, and proposing solutions such as 
"Community Working Groups"). 
125. Speiss, supra note 119, at 35. 
126. WERNSTEDT ET AL., THE BROWNFIELDS PHENOMENON, supra note 26, at 4-5. 
127. See Eisen, Brownfie/ds of Dreams, supra note 16, at 998, 1000, 1002-03, 1005, 1008. 
128. 42 U.S.C. § 9617 (2011) (describing the public participation requirements). 
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Although VCPs do not typically require public participation, 
developers are increasingly working with affected communities to garner 
support for individual projects. 129 Unfortunately, even when developers 
conduct public meetings or other means of involvement, the level of 
participation can fall far short of meaningful input. 130 In many cities, there 
are no obvious stakeholders to voice concerns of residents near brownfields 
sites, let alone engage in discussions with developers that have already 
committed to moving projects forward. 131 Designating or forming a citizen 
"steering committee" or other community-based group can lead to enhanced 
public participation and a wider focus on community redevelopment, 
particularly if that organization is an existing group that has knowledge and 
expertise in the affected community. 132 Regardless of the means chosen to 
provide for public input, the challenge remains at many sites and in many 
cities to allow affected communities to have a meaningful say in the future 
of brownfields projects. 133 
C. Evaluation of Site and Program Results 
In 2011, news reports pointed to numerous shortcomings in the New 
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection's (DEP) assessments of the 
1,600 sites awarded grants under the state's fund for brownfields 
remediation. 134 Officials did now know, for example, whether the sites had 
ever been developed for the specific purposes identified in the grants. 135 
The DEP's Commissioner subsequently criticized these reports, calling the 
program a "national model" and stating that, "the DEP and EDA closely 
track exactly how much HDRSF money is being spent on each brownfields 
project through a rigorous process that includes thorough technical and 
financial reviews."136 This fell short of addressing all of the critics' claims, 
and highlighted a larger problem present in New Jersey and many other 
129. See Eisen, Brownfields at 20, supra note 3, at 224. 
130. Speiss, supra note 119, at 32. See SARNI, supra note 97, at 85. 
131. See BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 3, at 282. 
132. See HOLLANDER ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF BROWNFIELDS REGENERATION, supra note 19, 
at 88; NAT'L CTR. FOR NEIGHBORHOOD & BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT, supra note 118, at I-
I. 
133. BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 3, at 283. 
134. Christopher Baxter, N.J. officials didn't track the $281 M spent from brownfields fund to 
clean polluted properties, NJ.COM (July 31, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://www.nj.com/news/ 
index.ssf/2011 /07 /nj_ officials_ say_ they_ failed_ t.html. 
135. Id 
136. Bob Martin & Caren Franzini, Turning N.J. brownfields green again, NJ.COM (Aug. 15, 
2011 7:24 AM), http://blog.nj.com/njv _guest_ blog/2011/08/turning_ nj_ brownfields _green_ a. 
html. 
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states: while a large number of projects have been processed through state 
VCPs, there is little adequate analysis of the results. 137 The VCP process 
focuses on the present day problem of transforming an abandoned or 
underused site into a locus for commerce, and, as a result, has not focused 
on impacts of site redevelopment after initial remediation and reuse 
activities. m 
To date there has not been much "systematic, careful documentation of 
actual practice at a wide range of [brownfield] sites," 139 and states do not 
have formal processes in place to evaluate sites over time. 140 Years after 
VCPs have been operating, research is finally underway to assess long-term 
impacts, 141 but adequate methodologies are not in place. In particular, it has 
been noted that, "methods and estimates for quantifying life cycle impacts, 
especially climate change mitigation associated with Brownfield 
development, do not currently exist."142 States should do more to address 
this shortcoming of understanding the impacts of brownfields 
redevelopment in affected communities. 
D. Public Investment in Brownfie/ds Sites: Critical But Often Lagging 
In a high-profile "miss," the New Jersey DEP announced in summer 
2011 that the fund it administers to provide funding for assessment and 
remediation of brownfields sites had run out of money. 143 Projects in the 
137. See SHAW ET AL., supra note 37, at iii. 
138. See W. Pa. Brownfields Ctr., About the Western Pennsylvania Brownfields Center, 
CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV., http://www.cmu.edu/steinbrenner/brownfields/ About/index.html; 
WERNSTEDT ET AL., THE BROWNFIELDS PHENOMENON, supra note 26, at 18. 
139. NAT'L Ass'N OF LOCAL GOV'T PROF'LS. & NE.-MIDWEST INST., supra note 18, at 9-10; 
WERNSTEDT ET AL., THE BROWNFIELDS PHENOMENON., supra note 26, at I. See Richard c. Hula 
& Rebecca Bromley-Trujillo, Cleaning Up the Mess: Redevelopment of Urban Brownfields, 24 
ECON. DEV'T Q. 276 (2010) ("Although [brownfields] programs are often perceived as having a 
positive impact, there is remarkably little evidence beyond anecdotal examples to support such 
claims."). 
140. See Auld et al., supra note 117; WERNSTEDT ET AL., THE BROWNFIELDS PHENOMENON, 
supra note 26, at 6. 
141. SHAW ET AL., supra note 37, at iii (listing specific proposals relating to measuring 
impacts of brownfields projects in New Jersey). 
142. W. Pa. Brownfields Ctr., Assessing Brownfields Sustainability, CARNEGIE MELLON 
UNIV., http://www.crnu.edu/steinbrenner/brownfields/Current%20Projects/sustainability.htrnl. 
143. The fund in question is New Jersey's Hazardous Discharge Site Remediation Fund 
(HDSRF), funded through a business tax. Baxter, N.J. to shut down state initiative, supra note 22; 
Hazardous Discharge Site Remediation Fund, N.J. DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROT., (last updated June 27, 
2011 ), http://www.nj.gov/dep/srp/finance/hdsrf/. 
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pipeline totaling $71 million were suspended, leaving their future in 
doubt. 144 
This highlights a major challenge of current brownfields policy. Public 
support (including funding for site assessment and other purposes) is often 
critical for the success of brownfields redevelopment. 145 Initiatives at all 
levels of government target remediation and social, economic, institutional, 
and other aspects of brownfields reuse. 146 Public involvement begins at the 
very start of the process. In many communities, interest in brownfields is 
low, and this is especially true for small brownfields or those in cities with 
"little interest from developers and a lack of knowledge on how to proceed 
with redevelopment."147 Localities and prospective developers interested in 
brownfields reuse often must also address capacity and management 
issues. 148 Developers can find the brownfields redevelopment process 
overly complex. 149 Matching developers with opportunities to remediate 
and reuse brownfields requires careful planning, for example, by employing 
marketing approaches and designating local officials as contact points to 
navigate complex approval processes. 150 
Public funding can be an important factor in a project's success. 
Developers can obtain resources for a site's evaluation, remediation and 
reuse from a wide variety of federal and state agencies. 151 As Table 1 
indicates, state grant, loan, training and education programs, and tax and 
other financing incentives support brownfields redevelopment. 152 At the 
federal level, the EPA implemented the SBLRBRA with federal grants and 
144. Baxter, N.J. to shut down state initiative, supra note 22; Broke Brownfield Fund is Bad 
Policy, says Sierra Club, NJTODAY.NET, (June 16, 2011), http://njtoday.net/2011/06/16/broke-
brownfield-fund-is-bad-policy-says-sierra-club/. 
145. See Broke Brownfield Fund is Bad Policy, says Sierra Club, supra note 144. 
146. SARNI, supra note 97, at 42-43. 
147. W. Pa. Brownfields Ctr., USEPA Training, Research, and Technical Assistance Project, 
CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV., http://www.cmu.edu/steinbrenner/brownfields/epa-lca-project/index. 
html. 
148. HOLLANDER ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF BROWNFIELDS REGENERATION, supra note 19, at 
66. 
149. Catherine Finneran, Attracting Development to Brownfields Sites: A Local Challenge, 
PUB. MGMT. MAG., Nov. 2006, available at http://webapps.icma.org/pm/8810/public/cover.cfm? 
author=Catherine%20Finneran&title=Attracting%20Development%20To%20Brownfields%20Sit 
es%3A %20A %20Local%20Challenge&subtitle. 
150. Id. 
151. Charles Bartsch, Financing Brownfield Cleanup and Development, GOVERNMENT 
FINANCE REVIEW, 27 (February 2002), http://www.gfoa.org/downloads/FinancingBrownfield 
CleanupandRedevelopment_OOO.pdf(describing available federal and state resources). 
152. HOLLANDER ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF BROWNFIELDS REGENERATION, supra note 19, at 
13-14. 
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other tools to address brownfields sites. 153 These resources include grant 
programs for characterization of brownfields sites, and site analytical tools 
that can help make the process of environmental investigation and 
remediation less onerous and costly. 154 The EPA's Brownfields 
Assessment Grants are available to "inventory, characterize, assess, and 
conduct planning and community involvement related to brownfields 
sites."155 Once a site has been selected for analysis, the use of 
comprehensive site analytical tools such as the EPA's Triad approach can 
streamline environmental investigation and cut remediation costs. 156 The 
EPA's brownfields website cites a number of redevelopment "Success 
Stories" linked to its brownfields programs. 157 
Other federal agencies support site redevelopment activities, 158 and 
agencies are teaming together to address brownfields, with the HUD-DOT-
EPA Interagency Partnership for Sustainable Communities (formed in 
2009) serving as a notable example. 159 Federal programs on infrastructure 
and housing and community development are adapting to promote site 
redevelopment and reuse. 160 A particular focus is the link between 
brownfields redevelopment and economic growth. 161 Brownfields Job 
Training Grants, part of the $100 million that the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act made available to the EPA, 162 are an example of this 
trend. Brownfields redevelopment is a source of "green jobs," linking 
153. Brownfields and Land Revitalization, U.S. EPA (Feb. 3, 2011), http://web.archive.org/ 
web/20110203132536/http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/about.htm (accessed by searching for 
www.epa.gov/brownfields/about.htm in the Internet Archive index). 
154. Id. 
155. Assessment Pilots/Grants, U.S. EPA, (last updated Sept. 29, 2010), http://epa.gov/ 
brownfields/assessment_grants.htm. 
156. See Brownfield Site Contamination Investigation, supra note 81, at 5 ("The Triad 
approach is useful for Brownfield sites because it considers the whole site (not just Area of 
Concern focuses), [and] is flexible (can be adjusted to unexpected conditions) and integrates all 
stakeholders into the site decision making process .... "). 
157. Brownfields Success Stories, U.S. EPA, (last updated Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.epa.gov/ 
swerosps/bf/success/. 
158. HOLLANDER ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF BROWNFIELDS REGENERATION, supra note 19, at 
13. 
159. HUD-DOT-EPA Partnership for Sustainable Communities, U.S. EPA (last updated Sept. 
18, 2012), http://www.epa.gov/smartgrowth/partnership/index.html. 
160. See SARNI,supranote97, at 57. 
161. Id. at 57-58. 
162. Of the $100 million available under the ARRA, the EPA used $6.8 million for job 
training. Brownfields Program Activities Under the Recovery Act, U.S. EPA (last updated April 5, 
2012), http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/eparecovery/; Legislation & Policy: Stimulus Status 
Report, NAT'L BROWNFIELD Ass'N, http://www.brownfieldassociation.org/News/Default. 
aspx#Congress. 
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greentech such as renewable energy sources and green building 
construction with job creation. 163 
Table 1 
Selected Brownfields Financial Assistance Programs164 
Program/Incentive Level of Description Notes 
Government 
rownfields ederal Hows the developer eauthorized 
xpensing o deduct hrough 
ax Incentive environmental ecember, 2011 
leanup costs in the 
ear that they are 
· curred, rather than 
capitalize them over 
istoric ederal 4.7 billion in 
ehabilitation estoration of ork at 1,044 
ax Credits ites in 2009 
roperties & for Source: National 
ehabilitation of non- ark Service) 
ertified sites 
ax-increment States Guarantees stream of xample: 
inancing (TIP) increased property ennsylvania TIP 
guarantees axesthatrepayTIP uarantee 
onds rogram 
163. SARNI, supra note 97, at 58. See VAN JONES, THE GREEN COLLAR ECONOMY 191 
(2008) (discussing this trend). 
164. This Table is derived from programs described in A Guide to Federal Tax Incentives for 
Brownfields Redevelopment, U.S. EPA (2011), www.epa.gov/brownfields/tax/tax_guide.pdf 
[hereinafter EPA Tax Incentives]. 
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ond, loan and/or tates irect funding xamples: 
ant funding rograms that differ ow-interest 
epending on the leanup loans 
tate (Delaware, 
diana, and 
isconsin); 
emediation 
ant funds (New 
ersey165 and 
innesota) 
er programs ederal/state rograms designed xamples: State 
or other purposes lean Water 
hat can be used for evolving Loan 
rownfields sites unds; renewable 
energy incentive 
The availability of public funding can be critical to brownfields 
redevelopment, and project success often "depends on the extent that public 
investments leverage private funds." 166 Public funding is especially 
important when site assessment and remediation costs exceed current 
property values, 167 which front-loads the developer's investment.168 As the 
New Jersey program's shortfall illustrates, continued public investment is 
not always guaranteed in the current tight budgetary climate. 169 This is a 
serious threat to future brownfields remediation and reuse projects. 
165. In New Jersey, these funds come from the HSDRF, the program underfunded in 2011. 
Hazardous Discharge Site Remediation Fund, supra note 143. 
166. See EPA, INVESTING IN PARTNERSHIP, POSSIBILITY, AND PEOPLE, supra note 6, at 33. 
See also U.S. CONF. OF MAYORS, supra note 64, at 11 ("Cities were asked to identify the most 
useful tools to redevelop brownfield sites. The top four, in order, were: EPA Assessment Funding, 
Private Sector Investment, EPA Clean-Up Funds, and State programs such as the State Voluntary 
Clean-Up Programs."). 
167. NAT'L ASS'N OF LOCAL Gov'r PROF' LS. & NE.-MIDWEST INST., supra note 18, at 5. 
168. See U.S. CONF. OF MAYORS, supra note 64, at 11; EPA, INVESTING IN PARTNERSHIP, 
POSSIBILITY, AND PEOPLE, supra note 6, at 33-34. 
169. EPA Tax Incentives, supra note 164, at 24; NAT'L ASS'N OF LOCAL GOV'TPROF'LS. & 
NE.-MIDWEST INST., supra note 18, at 7. 
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E. Oversight ... After All These Years 
Brownfields remediation activities do not eliminate all risks, in part 
due to relaxed cleanup standards. As the brownfields history grows longer, 
there may be problematic sites if states do not have aggressive provisions 
for revisiting cleanups. 170 The efficacy of some brownfields cleanups has 
come under fire years afterwards as contamination has been discovered. 171 
In one notorious example in New Jersey, the "Kiddie Kollege" day care 
center built on a former brownfield turned out to be situated on 
contaminated land. 172 
States typically protect against backsliding with reopeners in VCPs that 
allow state environmental departments to require additional cleanup 
activities at a later date if changed conditions warrant it. 173 These reopeners 
have several drawbacks. In a system such as New Jersey's post-2009 Site 
Remediation Program, the state has no involvement with the site in its 
initial cleanup, 174 so it is unlikely to be vigilant in discovering post-
remediation flaws. Also, reopeners in VCPs tend to be limited to 
intervening to prevent imminent harm, as any broader provision is typically 
perceived as a deterrent to the initial entry into a VCP (although one 
empirical study has found that few sites are reopened and the fear is largely 
unwarranted175). 
One study suggests that "reopener rates may increase with more 
vigorous enforcement and over the passage of time," 176 but it seems more 
likely that fewer sites will be addressed in the future. Any reopener 
provision depends both on resources available in the future to state 
environmental agencies, and on the willingness of those agencies to tackle 
problems at sites they believed were successfully addressed in the past. The 
problem of resources to devote to enforcement is especially problematic in 
tight budgetary climates, as cutbacks in state budgets can lead to a slower 
170. WERNSTEDT ET AL., THE BROWNFIELDS PHENOMENON, supra note 26, at 2, 12 (noting 
that "more opportunities for reopeners will arise as site histories lengthen at voluntarily 
remediated sites"); Pendergrass, supra note 63, at 1308-09 (discussing the need to audit sites with 
institutional controls). 
171. See Eisen, Brownfields Policies for Sustainable Cities, supra note 17, at 216-217. 
172. Rath, supra note 2, at 338-39, and Eisen, Brownfields at 20, supra note 3, at 744-45, 
discuss this and other sites involving the New Jersey site remediation programs. 
173. See John Pendergrass et al., Quantifying Long-Term Environmental Regulatory Risk for 
Brownjields: Are Reopeners Really an Issue?, 46 J. ENVTL. PLAN. & MGMT. 257 (2003) . 
. 174. See Maro, supra note 20, at 159. 
175. See Pendergrass et al., supra note 173, at 257 (noting that "among the 46 states with 
VCPs, only 12 cases were reopened out of 11,497 closed environmental cases, a reopener rate of 
between 0.1 % and 0.2%"). 
176. Id. 
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pace of cleanups and less vigilant oversight of brownfields sites. 177 State 
environmental agencies have been paring back the resources they devote to 
enforcement generally, and New Jersey is no exception. 178 With limited 
resources, few state environmental agencies will prioritize oversight and 
monitoring of completed brownfields sites ahead of ongoing enforcement 
actions. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
"Finality" is elusive in brownfields redevelopment. Decades after their 
inception, brownfields redevelopment programs are mature environmental 
programs with many successes. However, closing the book on brownfields 
means much more than simply assessing whether remediation at some 
individual brownfields sites has been successful. Given the original 
preoccupation with shining a light on these neglected sites and getting them 
back into the stream of commerce, finality would mean that all of them 
have been inventoried, investigated, and remediated if needed. Moreover, 
the focus on initial cleanups comes at the expense of monitoring sites and 
assessing long-term results, all of which need increased attention. If states 
discover contamination more significant than originally present, they must 
address it. In addition, major societal developments in the two decades 
since "brownfields" first entered the nation's vocabulary, particularly the 
growth of the environmental justice movement and the increased focus on 
addressing climate change, have shown the limitations of VCPs' parcel-by-
parcel, developer-centered approach. 
The specter of federal liability may be less significant than it once was, 
and VCPs have been responsible for many successes, but the final verdict 
on brownfields programs has yet to be rendered. 
177. See EPA, STATE BROWNFIELDS AND VOLUNTARY RESPONSE PROGRAMS, supra note 8, 
at l; Eisen, Brownfields Policies/or Sustainable Cities, supra note 17, at 216. 
178. Rath, supra note 2, at 342-43 (describing the funding cutbacks and deregulatory 
legislation that have decreased the state's role in waste remediation). 

